report, WHO seeks verifi cation from States Parties in whose territory the event occurs.
The declaration of a public health emergency of international concern is the crucial governance activity of the International Health Regulations. The Director-General has sole power to declare and to terminate a public health emergency of international concern but must consider information provided by a State Party; the decision instrument; Emergency Committee advice; scientifi c principles and evidence; and a risk assessment of human health, international spread, and interference with international traffi c. If the Director-General declares a public health emergency of international concern, she must issue temporary, non-binding recommendations describing health measures that States Parties should take.
Since 2007, the Director-General has declared three public health emergencies of international concern. During the 2009 H1N1 infl uenza pandemic, WHO declared the fi rst ever public health emergency of international concern but was criticised for fuelling public fear. State Parties widely disregarded WHO's temporary recommendations; 7, 8 however, in 2011, the Review Committee on International Health Regulations functioning during the H1N1 infl uence pandemic cautioned, "The world is ill-prepared to respond to a severe infl uenza pandemic." 9 In 2014, the Director-General declared two further public health emergencies of international concern, for polio and for Ebola. The designation of polio seemed counterintuitive because only a handful of cases had been diagnosed compared with previous years. Yet, small pockets of polio in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria were putting global eradication at risk. In the case of Ebola, the Director-General waited 4 months after Médecins Sans Frontières announced an "unprecedented outbreak" to declare a public health emergency of international concern on Aug 8, 2014. 10 WHO's Ebola Interim Assessment Panel in July, 2015, said urgent warnings "either did not reach senior leaders or senior leaders did not recognise their signifi cance." 11 Several health emergency events have not resulted in a declaration of a public health emergency of international concern. Currently, the world is watching outbreaks of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, which has not triggered a public health emergency of international concern declaration despite reaching more than 26 countries and causing 575 deaths by November, 2015. 12, 13 The Emergency Committee advised that, without sustained community transmission, the conditions for a public health emergency of international concern have not been met. 14 The Director-General did not even convene an Emergency Committee for major events such as cholera in Haiti, the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, and the use of chemical weapons in Syria.
Reforming the International Health Regulations

Towards a well functioning global detection and response system
Despite shortcomings, the International Health Regulations is an important governing framework. Yet, a crisis of confi dence in the Regulations exists, with the Review Committee on International Health Regulations functioning during Ebola currently deliberating. 15 We propose a series of operational and legal reforms. Operational reforms are often preferable. Amendments to the text of the International Health Regulations require World Health Assembly approval, do not enter into force immediately, and must be operationalised to be successful. Furthermore, reopening the full text could entail a multiyear negotiating process, which risks weakening the International Health Regulations' norms and protection of human rights. Even for our proposed legal reforms, we suggest ways to achieve them by textual interpretation and annex amendments in an attempt to avoid renegotiating the main text of the International Health Regulations.
As shown in the fi gure, although none of the following proposed reforms is a solution on its own, collectively they could help to build a well functioning global detection and response system. Some proposals will be easier to achieve than others, although all are needed reforms.
National core capacities
Achievement of core capacities by all States Parties remains an indisputable baseline for preparedness. The initial deadline to meet the International Health Regulations' core capacities was 2012, but WHO extended the deadline to 2016 for 81 States Parties. Only 64 States Parties have affi rmed meeting core capacities. 16 A well funded, prioritised, and comprehensive global plan is now past due. The November, 2014, International Health Regulations Review Committee off ered a sound roadmap: strengthen self-assessment; test capacities through simulations; promote regional and crossregional learning; and measure performance through peer review and external assessments. 16 Such capacity building must go hand-in-hand with universal health coverage, a major target in the Sustainable Development Goals. The following three recommendations could Develop publicly accessible online training platforms to assist in use of annex 2 decision instrument Develop a gradient for public health emergency of international concern declaration Require states to automatically notify WHO of additional diseases that could become a public health emergency of international concern
Further increase transparency of Emergency Committee deliberations and findings Increasing assessed dues, although important to WHO's future, is politically fraught. Alternative fi nancing mechanisms could include the Global Health Security Agenda, the World Bank's proposed Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility, or a donors' conference. 1, 17, 18 Irrespective of the funding mechanism, ensuring sustainable resources would strengthen security for all.
Second, WHO should establish an independent peer-review core capacity evaluation system, with a feedback loop for continuous quality improvement. More rigorous evaluation of core capacities need to be undertaken. WHO allows States Parties to self-assess their capacities, with many not reporting whether they have met their obligation to develop core capacities. States often resist external assessment because of sovereignty concerns, but the new system would aim to foster cooperation. Domestic and external experts would work constructively with governments to identify capacity gaps, develop a jointly funded roadmap, and identify measurable benchmarks for success. If evaluations consistently led to technical and fi nancial assistance, States Parties would be more likely to cooperate.
Third, civil society participation in reviewing core capacities should be enhanced. States Parties' reports and WHO evaluations should be open to public scrutiny to increase transparency. As with other spheres of international law, such as human rights and climate change, civil society could off er "shadow" reports to States Parties' reports and WHO evaluations and advocate for full funding of national capacities and fulfi lling international obligations.
International Health Regulations Emergency Committees: transparent and independent
After facing criticism for disclosing the names of Emergency Committee members only after the H1N1 public health emergency of international concern was terminated, WHO improved public trust by releasing member names for all subsequent Emergency and Review Committees. 19 WHO also pledged transparency about confl icts of interest. 20 Concerns persist, however, that Emergency Committees are infl uenced by politics rather than strictly reviewing scientifi c evidence. To increase transparency, WHO could publish full meeting minutes, provide web access to documents, and off er live updates through social media platforms.
Transparent Emergency Committee deliberations showing independence would build public trust, but reforms are of little value if the Director-General does not convene an Emergency Committee. Outside WHO's governing structure and drawing on civil society, an expert independent committee could convene to review data for disease outbreaks and recommend actions to the Director-General.
Reporting and surveillance: the decision instrument (annex 2)
The World Health Assembly could amend the decision instrument to reduce States Parties' reporting discretion, avoiding delayed notifi cation or verifi cation. Presently, four diseases automatically require notifi cation. Annex 2 of the International Health Regulations could be modifi ed to require that additional listed diseases become automatically reportable. Limiting States Parties' discretion could simplify decision making and reinforce the norm of early notifi cation. Routine notifi cations, moreover, would reduce the risk of under-reporting. Guinean offi cials, for example, initially downplayed the risk, reporting only confi rmed Ebola cases. 21 Procedurally, the World Health Assembly could update annex 2 of the International Health Regulations as it did with annex 7 regarding yellow fever vaccination. 22 The Ebola Interim Assessment Panel said there was unawareness or incomplete understanding of International Health Regulations requirements at many levels. 14 
WHO could assist States Parties in using the decision instrument by making International Health
Regulations training publicly accessible through online platforms. The Health Security Learning Platform is a promising start, but is hard to fi nd on WHO's website; tutorials should be accessible without needing registration.
Furthermore, WHO should publicly acknowledge information received from non-governmental sources, and help with unoffi cial reporting. For example, to help gather real-time intelligence, WHO could develop web, phone, and tablet applications to report to WHO's Strategic Health Operations Centre. 23 Even if a State Party does not corroborate an unoffi cial source, WHO should undertake its own analysis, sharing information transparently to the fullest extent possible in accordance with article 11 of the International Health Regulations. The new web portal that WHO is developing for information sharing and transparency may assist in implementing this recommendation. 24
Public health emergencies of international concern
A public health emergency of international concern declaration is the public face of WHO's outbreak response, but WHO has several instruments supporting earlier action. In view of the public symbolism of a public health emergency of international concern declaration, we believe that these emergency response frameworks must be integrated with International Health Regulations' processes. For example, WHO uses the Emergency Respons e Frame work to inform the international community of an outbreak's severity in a graduated manner. 24 A public health emergency of international concern declaration, however, would still be needed to raise the global alert, stiff en political resolve, and mobilise further resources.
Travel and trade restrictions: temporary recommendations and additional measures
State and private industry disregard for WHO temporary recommendations-particularly travel and trade restrictions and injudicious quarantines-undermine the International Health Regulations. Temporary recom mendations for Ebola did not succeed on two fronts: the Ebola-aff ected countries' health systems did not have the resources to implement WHO temporary recommendations; and States Parties, because of domestic political pressure, disregarded temporary recommendations and did not discourage private disruptions of travel and trade, such as airlines cancelling fl ights. Governments imposed additional measures, impeding deployment of health workers and medical supplies to the aff ected region.
To 
Broadening the International Health Regulations: toward "One-Health"
The Inter national Health Regulations (article 14) requires WHO to cooperate and coordinate its activities with intergovernmental bodies, including entering into formal agreements. These agreements could focus on one-health strategies, approaches based in the connections between human, animal, and environmental health. Cooperative arrangements can help one-health strategies, such as reducing antibiotic use in animals and misuse in humans; monitoring and preventing zoological infections; ensuring secure handling of hazardous materials; and facilitating vaccine research. Furthermore, equitable sharing of the benefi ts and burdens of scientifi c technology is crucial. The World Health Assembly should expand the Pandemic Infl uenza Preparedness Framework during its upcoming review of the Framework and integrate it with the International Health Regulations.
The way forward 10 years after its adoption, the time has come to realise the International Health Regulations' promise. The unconscionable Ebola epidemic opened a window of opportunity for fundamental reform-both for the International Health Regulations and the organisation that oversees the treaty. That political window, however, is rapidly closing. Donor fatigue, fading memories, and competing priorities are diverting political attention. Empowering WHO and realising the International Health Regulations' potential would shore up global health security-an important investment in human and animal health, while reducing the vast economic consequences of the next global health emergency.
